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Abstract Debates about the future are an essential medium of
modern societies’ self-understanding and governance. In this
context, future studies and reflections are frequently advising
decision-making processes. But the considerable diversity of
statements about the future and the divergence which often
becomes apparent regarding the prospects of the future threat-
en the possibility of delivering the desired orientation. The
more divergent the envisioned futures, the more providing
reliable orientation might be without any chance of success.
Against this background the aim of this paper is to distinguish
three different modes of orientation which can be delivered by
future studies and reflections. The mode 1 orientation corre-
sponds to the decision-theoretical model: Statements about the
future are interpreted as a reliable framework into which
decisions and actions have to fit as good as possible. If future
studies result in strongly diverse statements (e.g. in the field of
energy scenarios), orientation is only possible in a mode 2
understanding: the futures form a set of diverse possibilities
within which some “robust” strategies for action might be
identified. But what is beyond this distinction? If futures
would completely diverge between, so to speak, paradise
and apocalypse, even the mode 2 approach would no longer
work (this case applies to some recent debates on new and
emerging sciences and technologies). For this case I would
like to suggest a ‘mode 3’ type orientation: even diverging
future studies’ results can be made subject to a ‘hermeneutics’
of the present, where we can learn about ourselves from the
diversity, variety and divergence of statements about the fu-
ture. What we can learn from this consideration that there are
extremely different ways to benefit from reflections on the
future. Their feasibility depends on an epistemological issue:
do images of the future in a certain context converge as soon
as more reliable knowledge is fed in, or is diversity or diver-
gence persistent?
Keywords Rational choice . Deliberative democracy .
Epistemology . Decision-support . Divergence of future
studies
Introduction and overview
In modern society, political and economic decisions are most-
ly oriented by considerations on the future [1]. Taking current
problem areas and diagnoses as starting point, we use futures
studies, projections, and debates to get orientation for today’s
decision-making (e.g. in the field of technology assessment,
cp. [2]). Debates about the future are an essential medium of
modern societies’ self-understanding and governance – and
futures studies are a highly sought-after advisor. However,
here we encounter a characteristic problem: futures studies
are in many fields controversial, divergent or even contradic-
tory with respect to their results, and contested [3] (Table 1).
The considerable diversity of the results of future studies
and reflections which becomes apparent in specific fields is
prima facie a threat for the desired orientation. In particular, in
cases of divergence they create a significant doubt about
whether we can learn from them at all for decision-making
processes. If the statements are so far apart that we have to
suspect large arbitrariness, the condition of the possibility of
giving orientation would no longer be met. As is well-known,
it is impossible to draw reliable conclusions from contradic-
tory or arbitrary premises. If the divergence is too high then
even the notion of “uncertainty” does no longer fit to the
situation. Even a “reflexive governance” [4] would not be
able to make sense of this extreme constellation. This
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diagnosis is definitely not new (e.g. [5–7]; see also Sections 2
and 3 of this paper). However, there are at least three reasons
to address it again in this paper:
First, it seems that the dramatic nature of the situation
briefly sketched is still underestimated. After all, these find-
ings question the prevailing theoretical model of society in
general, according to which modern societies orient them-
selves by considerations on the future instead of the reference
to the past (e.g. [1, 8]). Second, the observations of the
diversity of the results of future studies are well-known in
the futures research community and also reflected there [6, 7];
from the viewpoint of consumers and users of futures studies,
however, things look different. Still there is often the expec-
tation that futures studies can provide a clear orientation for
future developments along which pending decisions can be
“aligned”, from which they can be “derived” and relatively to
whom they can be “optimised”. And third, a new optimism is
currently emerging in parts of science that new methods in
information technology, modelling, and, above all, enormous
and increasingly connectable data bases (big data) open up
new ways of prognostic access to the future – the aforemen-
tioned dramatic findings would be obsolete if this would work
out. However, the question is if, under which conditions and
in which respects this optimism is reasonable.
These arguments give rise, again and again to reflect on
adequate ways of dealing with uncertainties but also with
diversity and divergence of future studies, prospects, and
reflections. The futures studies community does this now for
decades, often along the distinction between foresight and
forecast [5–7]. The specific and innovative focus of this paper
is to consider in some more detail the degree of divergence of
future studies and its relation with the respective type of
orientation to decision-makers and society which could legit-
imately be drawn from those future studies and reflections.
My proposal is to distinguish between three modes of orien-
tation1 referring to different constellations considering the
convergence, moderate diversity, or divergence of futures in
the fields under consideration:
& Mode 1 orientation: Decision-makers and the media often
expect that futures studies give immediate orientation in
the sense, as it is often put, to “derive optimal decisions”
from futures studies. They are expected to provide a
reliable framework for future development allowing that
decisions could then be optimised in relation to this frame-
work. Thismode of providing orientation by future studies
matches the decision-theoretical concept of “rational
choice”, and decision-making shall be supported by fu-
tures studies as a form of classic “decision support”. Mode
1 orientation is, however, only valid if sufficiently clear
causal knowledge is available allowing converging
forecasts [5] (Section 2).
& Mode 2 orientation: If futures studies cannot provide a
reliable and converging framework for future develop-
ments due to inherent and inevitable uncertainties or
resulting from epistemological limits to knowledge, it is
much more difficult to provide orientation. According to
the state of the art of future studies orientation-building in
this situation has to depart from a set of different foresights
(often scenarios). The orientation given in this situation
aims at identifying robust strategies , for example action
strategies towards sustainable development [9]. A major
point of my analysis is, however, that the diversity of
future studies must not mean complete divergence or
arbitrariness – otherwise even the derivation of ‘robust’
strategies would necessarily fail (Section 3).
& Mode 3 orientation: While the mode 1 and mode 2
orientation have already been discussed in the futures
research community, mostly using the distinction between
forecast and foresight, the remaining case – too high
diversity or complete divergence of pictures of the future
to allow for deriving robust strategies – has not found
deepened interest yet. Providing orientation in this case
seems to be impossible at the first glance – but there is a
constructive way as will be shown in this paper: orienta-
tion can be drawn from analysing the diverging futures
both semantically and hermeneutically (Section 4).
1 This is a good occasion to express my thanks to two anonymous
referees. Their feedback on an earlier version was essential to develop
the approach of three modes of orientation.
Table 1 Illustration of major properties of the three modes of orientation
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3
Approach to the future Predictive: one future Look for a corridor of sensible futures Open space of futures
spectrum of futures Convergence as ideal Bounded diversity Unbounded divergence
Preferred methodology Quantitative, model-based Quantitative or qualitative;
participatory
Narrative
Knowledge used Causal and statistical
knowledge, laws
Models, knowledge of stakeholders Associative knowledge, arguments
Role of normative issues Low Depends on case High
Orientation provided Decision-support, optimisation Robust action strategies Self-reflection and contemporary diagnostics
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This three-fold picture of different types of orientation to be
provided by future studies and reflections in different episte-
mological constellations extends the current picture working
with the main distinction between forecasts and foresights.
Furthermore, it allows for relating epistemic and epistemolog-
ical aspects (quality of the knowledge available, remaining
and perhaps inevitable uncertainties; convergence, diversity,
or divergence of futures) of future analyses in specific fields
with specific types of orientation to decision-makers and
society. And in addition, the approach allows transgressing
existing borderlines between the futures research community
(working mostly with mode 1 and 2 orientation) and other
communities operating with other types of futures, e.g. in the
field of visionary technologies, where mostly only mode 3
orientation is possible [10].
Disappointed expectations – mode 1 orientation
Orientation by considerations on the future was and is often
introduced in a way as if the imagination of future develop-
ments could create a reliable framework which reduces the
openness of the future considerably. This framework is ten
expected to make it possible (probably even quite simply) to
direct pending decisions, e.g. concerning regional develop-
ment or the expansion of infrastructures, in a way that they
ideally fit into this framework. By experience it is now quite
clear that such expectations cannot be fulfilled in complex
societal issues – this diagnosis based on empirical evidence
shall not be repeated here [11]. However, there are critical
questions on some premises of this mode which seem to shed
light on some very basic methodological problems related
with this approach – and which render the mode 1 approach
extremely problematic even without regarding empirical evi-
dence of its frequent inadequacy.
First of all, parameters for describing future developments
are divided into two categorically different parts in the mode 1
approach. One part regards the future as a set of events and
processes which result (more or less) causally from current
knowledge and which are, therefore, basically predictable and
foreseeable [8]. Regarding this part of the future, a determin-
istic understanding of history is hidden behind. The problems
of the realisation of this ideal programme were of course
recognised, but blamed on the complexity of societal relations,
the insufficient data base and the to date poor knowl-
edge of social and economic laws compared to natural
sciences. So these difficulties are often regarded as a
challenge which could be met by advances and effort in
futures research methodology and seldom as a strict
limit to prediction. Hopes for better mode 1 orientation by
methodological or epistemological progress in the field of
futures studies or by more and better data are based on this
optimism [13].
However, the question of “optimal” decisions would not
make sense in a generally deterministic understanding of
history. Because in that case we would not have to give
thought to pending decisions since they would be determined
anyhow. Therefore there must be assumptions about a second
part of the future whose course depends on our today’s deci-
sions and actions and is thus open for shaping. The mode 1
orientation by future studies is thus preceded by a fundamental
distinction: the distinction between regularly running and thus
predictable parts of future development on the one hand and
other parts that can be influenced by intentional human action
and decisions, on the other. In spite of the fact that this
distinction is a necessary precondition of the mode 1 approach
it is seldom a subject of discussion. This is a crucial issue
because it is absolutely not clear a priori which facets of
societal development fall into one or the other part, and upon
which arguments this depends (cp. [14] for the question of
social or technology determinism). Therefore, a severe lack of
analysis and reflection has to be diagnosed.
A deeper look into the use of future studies in decision-
making processes helps uncovering a second underlying as-
sumption of the mode 1 approach which might become prob-
lematic. The decision-making process in the framework of a
rational choice paradigm is about gathering all relevant infor-
mation to get orientation for a “good”, “right” or even “opti-
mal” decision. The use of knowledge about the future as
“important information” in this sense – which is exactly what
mode 1 orientation would be – includes premises especially
related to the term “derive” which is used here quite often.
This term and/or the argumentative context assumed with it
are, loosely speaking and certainly slightly overemphasised,
used in two directions:
& First, particular developments or states of the future are
“derived” from current knowledge in certain respects. In
logical-deductive reasoning [12] today’s knowledge of
regularities and laws is the source for “deriving” knowl-
edge on future developments. This covers exactly that part
of the future which has been classified as being predictable
already today (see above);
& Second, from this knowledge about the future decision-
makers “derive” which decision out of a set of alternative
options would be “optimal” for a specific question. This
applies exactly to the other part of the future which was
assumed to be influenceable (see above).
This approach follows the premise of the rational choice
paradigm that, under optimal conditions for decision-making
(i.e. above all with complete knowledge), there could be only
one rational (and therefore optimal) decision. In this model,
decisions – at least in certain respects – would be basically
predictable from and determined by today’s knowledge in-
cluding the detour of forming knowledge about the future. In
the framework of future developments which has been
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“derived” from today’s knowledge “optimal” decisions can in
turn be taken as “derivations”.
If we would succeed in obtaining such results from both
forms of “deriving” – from today’s knowledge regarding the
future and from the future regarding currently pending deci-
sions –, which clearly and with reason claim consensus then
the search for the best decision would, in principle, be auto-
matable in form of an algorithm. Troublesome and controver-
sial debates and difficult negotiation processes would no
longer be necessary. This is the latent (and technocratic!) ideal
behind the mode 1 orientation by futures studies. Its basic
structure can particularly be recognised by the fact that the
space for the shapeable part –which has to be assumed first in
order to be able to speak of alternative options for decision –
finally disappears completely in the “derivation” chain. This is
because this two-step “derivation” approach reduces the shap-
ing to an automatable act. Or, to put it in another way: the
distinction made above between one part of the future which
was introduced as determined and one part which is consid-
ered as shapeable disappears due to the fact that the shapeable
part is “derived” from the causal knowledge extrapolated to
the future. Thus the deterministic part of the future becomes
“encroaching” and also determines – via the figure of “deriv-
ing optimal decisions” – that part which was at first conceived
as shapeable.
Now of course we have to ask if and to what extent
scientifically generated knowledge about the future can meet
such rational choice expectations at all. A closer look at
practical usage creates doubt. The “double derivation” often
does not work for the simple reason that knowledge about the
future itself is often controversial and contested [3] and reveals
deep ambivalence [10]. Instead of achieving “optimal” deci-
sions we end up in controversy on different levels: about
today’s knowledge and its extrapolability to the future, about
the introduced futures themselves and then also about the
question if and with which argumentative force we can “de-
rive” decisions thereof. Such controversies often express con-
flicts of a pluralistic society since debates about the future also
include values, ideas of man, hopes and fears as well as
concepts of a future society which of course reflect the differ-
ent ideological and political positions. We may just think of
the field of energy policy and the debates about when which
share of the energy supply could be provided by renewables
and what this may mean for the stability of the grids and the
electricity price.
New methods of foresight, new algorithms and supercom-
puters or new ways of networking complex data bases cur-
rently spark hopes for at least a future realisation of mode 1
orientation by future studies. However, in principle we should
be sceptical about this. The epistemological analysis of futures
studies shows that the adoption of assumptions which are not
backed by causal knowledge is inevitable for the construction
of statements about the future [15, 16]. Statements about the
future are social constructs that arise from actions taken by
agents. Ingredients like knowledge components, values, as-
sumptions of different quality and many others are used to
create futures which are as consistent as possible. All this
happens within the “immanence of the present” which can
be left neither by logic nor by empiricism [17]. Futures studies
do not provide information on the future as such but on how it
presents itself in the context of specific constructions by
certain actors. And there is a large difference between this
boundedness to certain actors in societal fields and in scien-
tific ones. While in the latter scientific communities, e.g.
astronomers, can agree on knowledge about the future based
on accepted rules, this does not work out in societal fields.
Because futures can be constructed in very different ways here
since only the currently relevant aspects can be taken into
consideration for their construction and these aspects do not
only include knowledge but also interests, values, assessments
and considerations of relevance and priorities. These are nor-
mative and evaluative and can therefore always be denied.
The inevitable result of this variety of today’s assessments,
especially in a pluralistic society, is the reflection of this
variety in scientific futures and that it thus also necessarily
entails its diversity [3]. The diversity of futures reflects the
pluralism of the present – and renders mode 1 orientation
impossible in many cases. This explains the many disappoint-
ments with regard to the predictive capacity of futures studies.
A second argument for scepticism about the hopes that the
above-mentioned problem could be overcome by more re-
search originates from a well-known epistemological consid-
eration. The communication of societal futures is an interven-
tion into further development and changes the constellation
for which it was created. Thinking about the future is not
possible from a contemplative observer’s perspective; the
producers of knowledge about the future are part of the system
for which they construct futures. Here the familiar problem of
“self-fulfilling” and “self-destroying prophecy” ties in [18].
So the diversity of futures studies might be reducible in
particular areas, in particular when reliable causal or statistical
knowledge is available which, of course, varies from field to
field. However, diversity cannot be eliminated in general. The
diversity of futures is a necessary aspect of many of the fields
of futures studies; of course the degree varies in the different
fields. So we come to the conclusion that mode 1 orientation
often will not be possible. And I would like to add: it is very
probable that mode 1 orientation will not work for the partic-
ularly interesting topics, those fields with the largest openness
and uncertainty, with the biggest need for scientific orienta-
tion, reduction of uncertainties and clear orientations. To put it
in a paradox way: right there where futures studies are most
needed they are most unable to help in the framework of first-
order orientation. To compare it with the weather forecast: if
weather conditions are stable, the advice of the weather fore-
cast is reliable, but also superfluous. It is most difficult when
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the weather conditions are unstable and unclear – and this is
exactly when we would need it most. In the following I would
like to ask which sort of orientation by futures studies would
be possible for those “difficult cases” in the absence of mode 1
orientation.
The value of diversity – mode 2 orientation
So far it turned out that, first of all, mode 1 orientation by
futures studies is only possible if the results of the futures
studies converge to a “sufficient” amount.2 In the second place
we noticed that this condition is not fulfilled in important
societal fields of action and we are instead confronted with a
considerable diversity of the results of futures studies. Third, it
was briefly discussed that this situation cannot be overcome in
general, even with more research, due to the internal structure
and premises of futures studies. In this way, the diversity of
statements about the future has so far only been addressed
from a negative point of view: as a threat to the wish for
orientation. The expectation of direct (mode 1) orientation in
the sense of “deriving” reasonable or even optimal strategies
for action from futures studies (see Section 2) is often
destroyed by its irreducible diversity. In the following, we
will only consider the case of significant diversity to analyse
if and how orientation by futures studies can be provided in
another mode.3
The field of energy futures provides an illustrative exam-
ple. In the field of energy futures and related emission scenar-
ios we can find various degrees of diversity. For decades
incompatible and diverging energy futures have been
discussed without exact knowledge on which futures are to
which extent backed by knowledge, where the areas of con-
sensus are and where the futures are determined by assump-
tions on boundary conditions and societal developments
which are poorly or not at all verified. The diversity of energy
futures is significant: we are not talking about things like error
bars to illustrate the discrepancies among them but about
divergences of factors of two to four, both regarding the
expected total energy need in 2050 and its expected distribu-
tion between different energy carriers [20, 21; see also Fig. 1].
According to this, the opinions on the “right” decisions differ
as well, and the mode 1 orientation mode does not seem
really helpful.
Perceptions of the diversity of the results of futures studies
are often presented in a lamenting, regretting tone. “Unfortu-
nately” future developments were so difficult to predict that it
would become doubtful whether it is possible at all to draw
lessons for today’s governance. However, as it has been
shown above, this diversity is necessarily linked to the prep-
aration of futures studies, even though the extent varies in
different fields. But there is no sense in complaining about
something intrinsically necessary. On the contrary, we have to
ask constructively if there could not be other, rather indirect
ways of orientation in these cases apart from mode 1 orienta-
tion. Accordingly, a mode 2 orientation by futures studies
would have to operate constructively ab initio with the diver-
sity of futures studies and is probably even in need of them.
Diversity could then be a positive aspect . What we need here
is a radically changed perspective which faces the prevalent
concern that the diversity of futures impedes orientation.
This has successfully been done in the field of futures
studies, differentiating between forecasts and foresight [5–7].
While forecasting corresponds to the mode 1 approach in my
classification foresight aims at a broader and more explorative
view on futures acknowledging their necessary diversity. Fre-
quently, foresight ends up in a set of scenarios, e.g. for the
energy system, for regional development, or for the possible
future development of economic branches. Conclusions from
those diverse futures are often drawn in form of “robust”
action strategies, .i.e. strategies which are promising in all of
the possible futures considered [22, 23]. If, for example, we
want to phrase strategies for action for sustainable develop-
ment which should not be linked to one single future scenario
but geared to a bundle of different futures and suggest positive
sustainability effects, this contributes to a “robust” action in
terms of sustainability governance (e.g. [4]).
In order to achieve this type of orientation, the value of the
diversity of futures studies becomes clear. It is a value because
it is correlated with the, at least partly, openness of the future
and recalls it to the mind time and again. The diversity of
futures studies is a permanent memento , reminding us to
sound out the possibilities of shaping instead of rashly assum-
ing determinisms and following putative factual constraints
which are often only an expression of technocratic thinking or
specific interests. The variety of futures corresponds to think-
ing in options for actions instead of closing into the direction
of “optimal” decisions as is done in the line of thought of the
mode 1 approach. Furthermore, the question “where are we
heading”, which is commonly asked in the mode 1 approach,
is complemented with the question where we should be
heading then. The predicative view of future is supplemented
with, and maybe sometimes even replaced by, a normative
point of view of volition, non-volition or ought.We do not just
“derive” from futures how we should act; it is necessary to
form opinions and take decisions about volitional and non-
volitional issues. Exactly this opens up possibilities to use the
2 What is meant here by “sufficient”, which criteria could be developed
for this and how the fulfilment of this condition can be checked needs a
separate analysis and is not subject of this paper.
3 The above-mentioned condition of “sufficient” convergence is at least
partly fulfilled in many fields. Future analyses for demographic develop-
ment for example show discrepancies and divergences in detail, but
compared with the divergences in the energy sector they are markedly
small. So mode 1 orientation will entirely be possible in particular fields.
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diversity of futures constructively for democratic debate [24]
and to avoid technocratic closure of the future.
Of course the use of diverse futures studies for orientation
purposes is not without presuppositions. The precondition for
providing mode 2 orientation in the aforementioned sense is
that the diversity of the set of futures considered is limited in
some sense. There must be a corridor of sensible assumptions
about future developments: within the corridor several future
developments are regarded plausible but the field beyond the
corridor is not considered seriously because of certain argu-
ments. For example, in the field of energy scenarios there is
high diversity (see Fig. 1) but not arbitrariness because ex-
treme scenarios are rendered implausible. It is exactly this
precondition of relying to a corridor of plausible futures which
limits the applicability of the mode 2 approach – and provides
motivation to look beyond.
The value of divergence – mode 3 orientation
The necessary precondition of mode 2 orientation to be appli-
cable is the existence of well-argued corridors of the envis-
aged future development. Frequently, those corridors are mir-
rored in sets of scenarios where best-case and worst-case
scenarios serve as the borderlines of “sensible” future devel-
opments. But what could be done if this precondition is not
fulfilled, that means if there are no such borderlines, or if
proposed ones are heavily contested? If proposed future de-
velopments would be not only diverse but absolutely diver-
gent the suspicion of arbitrariness arises. Neither mode 1 nor
mode 2 orientation would then be possible because of the laws
of logics: no sensible output can be concluded from contra-
dicting or arbitrary input.
There are fields of futures reflection where the impossibil-
ity to apply the mode 1 or mode 2 approach clearly became
apparent. In the past decade, there has been a considerable
increase in visionary communication on future technologies
and their impacts on society. In particular, this has been and
still is the case in the fields of nanotechnology [17], human
enhancement and the converging technologies [10, 25], syn-
thetic biology and climate engineering. Visionary scientists
and science managers have put forward far-ranging visions
which have been disseminated by mass media and discussed
in science and the humanities. The emergence of this new
wave of visionary and futuristic communication [26] has
provoked renewed interest in the role played by imagined
visions of the future. These futuristic visions refer to a more
distant future, some decades ahead, and exhibit revolutionary
aspects in terms of technology and in terms of culture, human
behaviour, individual and social issues. They address possible
future scenarios for techno-visionary sciences and their im-
pacts on society at a very early stage in their scientific and
technological development. As a rule, little if any knowledge
is available about how the respective technology is likely to
develop, about the products which such development may
spawn and about the potential impact of using such products.
High degrees of uncertainty are thus involved leading to
severe controversies with regard not only to societal issues
but also to the feasibility of the visionary technologies. Fur-
thermore, images of the future range from paradise-like ex-
pectations to apocalyptic fears without a possibility to rank the
pro an con arguments in a clear way. In spite of lack of
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Fig. 1 Some scenarios for the energy demand of the year 2050 assuming
a World population of 9.5 billion: Shell-Scenario „Sustainable Develop-
ment“; three Scenarios of the EnergyWorld ConferencesWECA3,WEC
B and WEC C1; RIGES („Renewable Intensive Global Energy
Scenario“); Factor 4 Scenario and SEE („Solar Energy Economy“).
Source: modified after [19]). Though the scenarios presented are now
about ten years old the picture impressively describes the high diversity of
energy futures
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knowledge lively debates on these visionary technologies
emerged – and obviously, this field of futures reflections is
beyond the scope of the mode 2 approach.4
In such cases beyond the mode 2 approach knowledge
about the future could be used arbitrarily by representatives
of political-societal positions, substantial values and specific
interests to enforce their particular positions [3]. In this way
knowledge about the future would not orient pending deci-
sions but could only subsequently legitimise decisions already
taken. This could be quite rightly called an ideological use of
images of the future.
In this Section 1 will develop the thesis that even in this
seemingly disastrous situation orientation-building by
analysing futures is possible. However, the corresponding
mode 3 approach describes a completely different mechanism
of providing orientation compared to what we normally ex-
pect from futures studies and which is expressed by mode 1
andmode 2 approaches. The only orientation they can provide
given the irreducible divergence is a semantic and hermeneu-
tic structuring of a basically open future to allow a better
informed and reflected debate for preparing decision-
making. It is a matter of reflexive clarification of the condi-
tions under which people can act and decide today, taking into
account divergent future perspectives. So mode 3 orientation
can only be understood as an offer to improve the conditions
of an open, transparent and democratic deliberation and ne-
gotiation. The above-mentioned “rational choice” model can-
not be used here at all. Instead we are talking about another
mode of governance of closing and deciding to which I would
like to refer as “deliberative choice”.
In this mode, divergence of futures is not a threat but a
necessary condition for orientation considering the basically
open future which cannot be limited to convergent pictures.
Here it is constitutively the democratic dialogue in which it
has to be conferred and decided on the respective next steps –
in the light of the simultaneous openness of the future and
pending needs for decision-making. And especially here, in
situations of general openness, this dialogue is of vital signif-
icance to a deliberative democracy [24]. Mode 3 orientation
asks for the possibilities to orient this democratic conflict by
diverse and probably strongly divergent statements – a task
which seems to be almost paradoxical.
To trace the possibility of such mode 3 orientation, it is
necessary to reveal the reasons for and sources of divergence
of futures. What is crucial here is the diagnosis of an “imma-
nence of the present” in which futures studies and reflections
are trapped as well [17, 21]. Visions of the future are social
constructs, created and “manufactured” by people, groups and
organisations at respectively determined points in time [26].
Visions of the future result from a composition of ingredients
in certain processes (e.g. the methods of futures research). In
this way the respective current knowledge bases, but also
contemporary diagnoses, values and other forms of perception
of the world are adopted in these pictures of the future.
Divergence of visions of the future is, as briefly mentioned
above, the result of the consideration of controversial and
divergent knowledge bases and disputed values during their
creation: the divergence of futures mirrors the differences of
contemporary positions and reflects today’s pluralism. Thus,
uncovering these sources of the diverging futures could tell us
something about ourselves and today’s society.
So in those cases where mode 1 orientation does not work
out and even mode 2 orientation cannot be provided because
no corridor of future developments can be identified consen-
sually, pictures of the future hardly tell us about futures in the
sense of a present in the time to come, but rather about us
today. By analysing and reflecting futures studies we can also
learn something about ourselves – which would then be mode
3 orientation. If projections of future are interpreted in a way
that makes clear why we aggregate certain current ingredients
to specific futures and argue dedicatedly about them, then we
have learned something explicitly about ourselves which to
date has only been an implicit part of societal reality. Futures
studies and reflections as a medium of societal debate contain
knowledge and assessments which are worth being explicated
in order to allow a more transparent democratic debate and
deliberation. And then not only the diversity of futures studies
but also the divergence of pictures of the future is a value since
it reflects the variety of democratically but also scientifically
possible positions.
So mode 3 orientation is about trying to learn something
about ourselves, our societal practices, subliminal concerns,
implicit hopes and fears from the diversity and divergence of
futures studies. Of course: first, to this end futures have to be
interpreted or even ‘deconstructed’ accordingly which calls for
adequate assessment procedures [29] and for hermeneutic effort
[21, 28]. And second: this form of orientation is much more
modest than the expectation of being able to virtually derive
“right actions” from futures studies (Section 2). In the end, it
comprises of nothing more than improving the conditions for
democratic debates and future decisions to make them more
sophisticated, transparent and open. Its motivation is based on
the assumption that we are able to understand ourselves better,
our societal debates, scientific positions, the different interests,
hopes and fears, the often diverging perceptions and positions of
societal actors – even beyond sciences – once we better under-
stand the diversity and divergence of the concepts of the future.
Three modes of orientation – final remarks
In this article we have asked for the different forms of orien-
tation for the governance of modern societies by futures
4 Exactly this diagnosis was behind the criticisms against a mere
“speculative nano-ethics” [27, 28].
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studies and reflections. The suggested distinction between
mode 1, mode 2 and mode 3 orientation is geared to the
question if and to which extent the results of futures studies
tend to converge or diverge. If they are sufficiently conver-
gent, I refer to mode 1 orientation which is also assumed by
the popular decision-theoretical model. Statements about the
future are interpreted as a framework into which decisions and
actions have to fit as good as possible. According to a com-
mon phrase decisions and actions are “derived” from knowl-
edge about the future (Section 2).
Of course this model works rather bad or not at all in many
contexts since the required convergence of results of the
futures studies is not given. The field of energy scenarios
has often been used as example. The mode 2 orientation refers
to this case relying on the premise that the futures provided do
not converge but also not diverge completely. Instead, in this
case there have to be good reasons to assume a “corridor” of
sensible futures limiting the total openness. In this case orien-
tation to decision-making is possible by looking for “robust”
strategies of action promising in several futures within the
corridor identified (Section 3).
For the remaining case – completely diverging futures as was
and is the case in some new and emerging technologies such as
nanotechnology and human enhancement – it seems impossible
to derive some orientation because it is logically impossible to
derive any sensible output from contradicting or arbitrary inputs.
The main outcome of this article is the phrasing of an argumen-
tation which recognises futures studies and reflections also in
this case as suitable to give orientation – however, in a complete-
ly different mode 3 orientation (Section 4). The orientation
given then does not cover the recognition of future develop-
ments but the hermeneutics of the present, where we can learn
about ourselves from the variety and divergence of statements
about the future. This requires splitting the statements about
the future into their argumentative structure which in turn
offers possibilities to hold democratic debates about the future
in a more reflected and transparently enlightened way.
For summarizing these results we refer to Table 1 in the
Introduction.
The analysis provided above allows for giving some con-
clusions and recommendations for the further development of
futures studies and reflections:
& the distinction between deterministic and influenceable
aspects of the future (Section 2) should be reflected in-
depth including a categorization of the respective argu-
ments and a consideration of the influence of determining
the borderline between the two parts of the future on the
results of future studies:
& the “derivation” of futures from present knowledge
(including also other elements such as values and ad-hoc
assumptions) and the “derivation” of the “right” decision
from converging future projections (Section 2) also should
be made subject to reflection about the logical and episte-
mological status of the “derivation”
& key to the proposed distinction betweenmode 1, mode 2 and
mode 3 orientation by futures studies is whether they show
“sufficient” convergence or “strong divergence” - however,
between convergence and divergence there is a continuum
which should be made subject to further investigation
& anyway: already to apply the suggested distinction to a set
of futures needs an assessment procedure; making sense of
the diversity and divergence of the results of future studies
also needs procedures of analysis and assessment – meth-
odological work is needed in several respects
The overall conclusion is that further improving the scien-
tific quality of futures studies does not generally mean
strengthening their predictive capacity (this only might be
the case in specific fields) but rather working toward a better
understanding of the relations between future studies, the
provision of orientation and making use of the orientation
provided in decision-making [30].
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